This paper focuses on the impact of hidden information on strategic interaction in the context of trade agreements. In the presence of informational asymmetry it is possible that a tradeo¤ between liberalization and sustainability of cooperation emerges. It is shown that it may be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization associated with a strictly positive ex ante probability of deviation occurring. In that case, cooperation will break down in …nite time, and the optimal degree of liberalization cannot be applied inde…nitely. (JEL: F13, C72, C73, D82)
Introduction
A commonly raised objection against too far-reaching trade liberalization is that it may increase the incentive for non-cooperative (protectionist) behavior. Hence, liberalization should be restrained, in order to meet the objective of making liberalization sustainable over time. The implicit assumption behind such an argument is that there exists a tradeo¤ between liberalization and the sustainability of cooperation and that, while a higher degree of liberalization yields a higher expected short-term return, the loss stemming from an increased risk of a breakdown in cooperation is su¢ ciently large to outweigh the expected short-term gain. Hence, liberalization should be limited by the requirement of sustaining cooperation and avoiding protectionist measures in all contingencies.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a model that incorporates uncertainty and asymmetric information within a trade policy framework and to explore how this source of uncertainty a¤ects the scope for trade liberalization and its sustainability. The starting point is the notion that ex ante, when a trade agreement is negotiated, it is typically impossible to know with certainty how large the incentive to deviate will be, once the agreement is in place.
There may be various sources of uncertainty, but this paper will examine a situation where two countries are exposed to a random variable, the realization of which is only privately observable.
Due to this informational asymmetry, a government must infer the likelihood of its trading partner choosing cooperation from the commonly known distribution of the random variable, and the degree of liberalization agreed upon.
For the sake of analytical tractability, a model is employed where the weight attributed to present vis-à-vis future payo¤s is stochastically determined and non-observable to the trading partner. Thus a situation, in which there exists uncertainty about the shortsightedness of politicians is modelled. The weight attributed to present vis-á-vis future payo¤s can be regarded as 2 capturing the general uncertainty about the future under which decisions are taken.
It is shown that in the presence of this hidden-information-type of uncertainty, the scope for liberalization will decrease. Moreover, it is demonstrated how countries may face a tradeo¤, when higher degrees of liberalization are associated with decreasing probabilities of cooperation being maintained. It may nevertheless be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization such that there is a strictly positive likelihood of cooperation breaking down in …nite time, since the short-term gain from increasing liberalization may outweigh the long-term loss of cooperation eventually breaking down.
The following section reviews the literature on strategic interaction under various types of uncertainty. Section 3 introduces the model. The scope for liberalization under uncertainty is examined in section 4, and optimality under uncertainty is addressed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Background
The literature on the implementability and sustainability of trade agreements typically examines the strategic interrelationship between two trading countries that can in ‡uence world prices through their import tari¤s. The countries are in a Prisoner's Dilemma situation, where both would bene…t from mutually reducing tari¤s but where, from a short-term point of view, each country prefers to apply its best-response tari¤ vis-à-vis its trading partner. With repeated interaction between the trading partners, it is possible to sustain lower tari¤s, however. In standard fashion, by threatening to punish current-period deviations in future periods, the incentive to deviate can be balanced and cooperation be sustained.
The establishment of cooperation hinges on two factors. First, the discount factor must be su¢ ciently large for the future loss from being punished to outweigh the current gain from 3 deviating. The lower the cooperative tari¤s are set, the larger need the discount factor be.
Second, there must be a su¢ ciently high degree of trust between the two parties for cooperation to be established. A country will opt for cooperation only if it attributes a su¢ ciently high probability to cooperative behavior by its trading partner; believing that the trading partner will deviate makes deviation the preferred choice. The lower the cooperative tari¤s are set, the larger must the degree of trust in the trading partner be.
Introducing some sort of uncertainty into the conditions, under which decisions of complying with or breaching commitments made under a trade agreement are taken not only makes the analysis more complicated, but may also lead to di¤erent implications for the prospects of sustaining a cooperative arrangement. Several attempts have been made to incorporate uncertainty into the Prisoner's Dilemma setting of trade agreements. Obviously it is easy to …nd close correspondences to the literature on collusion under uncertainty. There are, broadly, three categories of uncertainty that have been addressed in the industrial organization literature and, to a lesser extent, also in the literature on trade agreements.
First, strategically interacting parties may be subject to ex ante uncertainty regarding a commonly observed shock which has an impact on the incentive to deviate from a cooperative arrangement. In Bagwell and Staiger (1990) , the case of negotiating an agreement in the presence of commonly observable trade volume ‡uctutations is analyzed. Periods of high trade volumes are associated with stronger incentives to deviate so as to make terms-of-trade gains and therefore, a cooperative agreement will have to allow for the cooperative tari¤ to adjust in order to dampen trade volume ‡uctuations and hence the incentive to deviate. This type of trade management can thus be seen as an attempt by countries to maintain the self-enforcing nature of existing international cooperation. The setting and the results in Bagwell and Staiger (1990) are similar to Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) These Nash reversions are not the result of deviation against the low-tari¤ agreement, but necessary to provide the incentives for sustaining cooperative low tari¤ episodes.
3
Finally, uncertainty can also arise when each party is exposed to a random variable, the realization of which cannot be observed by the opponent. Fudenberg et al. (1994) demonstrate that Nash superior equilibria exist in repeated games under this adverse-selection-type of uncertainty if su¢ cient weight is attributed to the future. Athey and Bagwell (2001) and Athey et al. (2004) elaborate on the impact of hidden information in in…nitely repeated Bertrand games between competing …rms when prices are publicly observed, but cost shocks are only privately observed.
With regard to uncertainty regarding only privately observable shocks in the context of trade cooperation, the case of one-stage games with implicitly assumed cooperative behavior has been examined by Feenstra (1987) and Feenstra and Lewis (1991) . Given the underlying assumption model cooperative arrangements between …rms that are subject to ex ante unknown, but commonly observable ‡uctuations in demand. 2 The same type of uncertainty also appears in Hungerford (1991) and Kovenock and Thursby (1992) , which both focus on the dispute settlement procedures of the GATT. 3 This result corresponds to the one obtained in Green and Porter (1984) where low realizations of the price trigger reversionary episodes when two …rms strategically interact in a Cournot duopoly that is a¤ected by unobservable demand shocks in ‡uencing the price level. See also Abreu et al. (1986) , who modify and generalize the Green-Porter model, and Fudenberg et al. (1994) , who provide folk theorems for moral-hazard-type of games. 5 that countries prefer to cooperate and apply agreed-upon policies, the problem addressed is how hidden information creates incentives to misrepresent in order to make gains. While these two contributions focus on the e¤ect of hidden information on outcomes in cooperative games, Jensen and Thursby (1990) investigate the e¤ect of private information on noncooperative equilibria and how the incentives for governments to establish tari¤ reputations might be in ‡uenced. Bagwell and Staiger (2005) examine the inclusion of safeguards and Martin and Vergote (2008) explore the role of retaliation in trade agreements in the presence of private information.
Hidden-information-type of uncertainty in the context of trade cooperation can be described as a situation where a government is exposed to some random variable that only it, and no one else, can observe, such that the true incentives faced by the government with regard to choosing to comply with or deviate from liberalization commitments are unknown to the trading partner(s). There exist various ways of introducing this type of uncertainty in the government's objective function. Baldwin (1987) introduces a politically realistic objective function (PROF) and shows it to be equivalent to the payo¤ functions derived from a wide range of political economy models. The PROF attributes di¤erent weights to consumer surplus, tari¤ revenues and di¤erent industry pro…ts. A commonly used way of introducing uncertainty is to let one of these weights, typically pro…ts of an import-competing sector, be randomly determined.
A simpler and analytically more tractable way of investigating the impact of uncertainty on the conditions for strategic interaction and cooperation in an in…nitely repeated setting is to let the government weigh current-period and future-period payo¤s and let one of these weights (and hence, the relative weight) be randomly determined in every period. In fact, attributing more weight to pro…ts in the import-competing sector is similar to giving more weight to present vis-à-vis future payo¤s. In both cases the incentives for protection increase.
In…nitely repeated games with stochastically determined discount factors have previouslybeen examined by Baye and Jansen (1996) . 4 In their model both parties are exposed to the same discount factor in every period, unlike in the present model where the two governments' realizations of the weight attributed to present payo¤s are uncorrelated and only privately observable. Dal Bo (2007) examines the case when the interest rate is stochastically determined in every period in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly setting. In contrast to the present model it is however assumed that the random variable applies to all players and therefore is common knowledge. Baye and Kovenock (2004) model a Bertrand duopoly supergame where each …rm's per-period discount factor is stochastically determined and only privately observable at the time prices are set.
The present paper models cooperation under adverse-selection-type of uncertainty in an in…nitely repeated setting. While previous work on this type of uncertainty in the industrial organization literature has primarily analyzed Bertrand oligopolies, the present model also has implications for repeated Cournot competition games under informational asymmetry, because tari¤ setting is strategically similar to Cournot-type of interaction. With regard to the literature on trade agreements under uncertainty, which hitherto has mostly focused on commonly observable shocks and moral hazard, the present paper contributes by analyzing the implications of hidden information for trade cooperation and providing a framework for examining how trade agreements could be designed to make liberalization more sustainable.
The Model
Let there be two symmetric countries, home and foreign (distinguished by an asterix), each with one sector. In standard fashion the two countries interact in an in…nitely repeated tari¤ setting game, and each government is assumed to be subject to a random variable that is only privately observable and i.i.d. across countries and periods. Due to symmetry, it su¢ ces to consider the home country. The random variable is assumed to enter, such that the home government's payo¤ function W in the current period is given by:
where w is the payo¤ of the current period, v the expected discounted future ‡ow of payo¤s, attribute to present payo¤s in every period. The density function '( ), which is assumed to be continuous for 2 [ min ; max ], and the associated cumulative distribution function ( ) are common knowledge, however. Hence, can be seen as a measure for the shortsightedness of a government (a high value of implies a low discount factor), while max represents the most myopic realization of possible.
For analytical tractability, a partial equilibrium setting where the current-period payo¤ w is additively separable in the home tari¤ t and the foreign tari¤ t , is assumed
There exists a best-response function t D (t ) arg max t w(t; t ). From the additive separability of w, it immediately follows that the within-period best-reply tari¤ t D is independent of t and hence constant, i.e. t D (t ) = arg max t u(t).
In the absence of cooperation, both countries apply the optimal tari¤ vis-à-vis each other, i.e. t = t = t D , and both receive the Nash equilibrium current-period payo¤ w N = w(t D ; t D ). Sincethe current-period payo¤ in every future period will be equal to w N , the government's payo¤ in the absence of cooperation will be given by W N = w N , i.e. it will be independent of .
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However, both countries can be made better o¤ by agreeing to mutually lower their tari¤s.
What prevents the implementation of a cooperative tari¤ t C < t D , associated with a currentperiod payo¤ w C = w(t C ; t C ) > w N , is that the two countries are stuck in a Prisoner's Dilemma.
If one country decides to break its commitment by applying the optimal tari¤ vis-à-vis its trading partner, it gets the current-period payo¤ w D = w(t D ; t C ) > w C , while its trading partner receives the payo¤ w S = w(t C ; t D ) < w N . Thus, both countries will apply t D , and their current-period payo¤ will be given by w N in the one-shot game.
The following assumptions regarding the properties of w(t; t ), re ‡ecting features of typical trade models, will be made. The payo¤ under mutual cooperation w C is concave in t C and has a unique maximum for
w D decreases unambiguously in t C , i.e. the incentive to deviate increases as t C decreases. 7 The decrease in w D is equal to the decrease in w C (i.e. w D and w C are tangent) at t C = t D and unambiguously larger for t C < t D . Thus, w D w C increases, and it does so at an increasing rate as t C decreases (see also …gures in the Appendix).
For analytical purposes de…ne
It is easily shown that lim t C !t D = 0 and that increases monotonously as t C decreases below t D . Hence, can be seen as a measure of trade liberalization. A low value of t C corresponds 5 For the derivation of W N = w N , see the Appendix. 6 Depending on the how w is speci…ed, t 0 may be negative (i.e. an import subsidy). 7 Here, a deviation is de…ned as breaching the agreement on liberalization. However, from a game theoretic point of view choosing to apply the best-response tari¤ need not constitute a deviation from the equilibrium path. 9 to a high value of and thus, a high degree of trade liberalization. Since w opt C > w N , the optimal degree of liberalization opt , corresponding to t C = t opt C , is strictly smaller than unity and, because w C = w N for t C = t 0 , the degree of liberalization 0 , corresponding to t C = t 0 , equals unity. The relevant range of cooperative tari¤s to consider is given by (t 0 ; t D ), corresponding to degrees of liberalization in the range (0; 1). In this range, it is the case that w D > w C > w N > w S , and strategic interaction is thus of Prisoner's Dilemma type.
As mentioned above, mutual deviation is the only equilibrium outcome in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game. Under an in…nite horizon, it is possible to create cooperation, however.
8 By threatening to punish deviations and thus associate the one-period gain from deviating with a future loss, it is possible to induce cooperative behavior. There exist many di¤erent ways of conceiving punishment phases. For simplicity grim-trigger strategies will be considered throughout the paper. Hence it will be assumed that deviations from the cooperative tari¤ will trigger in…nite reversion to the Nash equilibrium.
In the absence of uncertainty, = and, assuming a propensity for cooperative behavior across countries 9 , choosing cooperation yields W C = w C + (1 )w C = w C , while opting for
Cooperation is thus sustainable, if and only if
The left-hand side represents the short-term (current-period) gain from deviation, while the right-hand side represents the long-term loss from deviation. Since w C > w N under an agreement, rearranging terms yields the following relationship between the degree of liberalization and the discount factor, which is given by 1 , i.e. the weight attributed to the future ‡ow of payo¤s (see the Appendix).
(1) ,
Equation (1') tells us that in order to sustain cooperation, t C can only be reduced to the degree where does not exceed the weight attributed to the future ‡ow of payo¤s 1 . A lower , i.e. a smaller weight given to present payo¤s, implies that the upper bound for liberalization max increases, and it is thus possible to sustain a lower t C . The restriction given by (1') thus imposes an upper limit on the scope for liberalization.
Two well-known results immediately follow from condition (1'). First, it is always possible to …nd some > 0 (t C < t N ) that is sustainable for < 1 (i.e. a strictly positive discount factor).
Second, the optimal degree of liberalization opt can be sustained, if governments are su¢ ciently patient, i.e. if the weight attributed to current payo¤s is not too large ( 1 opt ).
The Scope for Trade Liberalization under Uncertainty
In what follows, the weights attributed to present payo¤s will be stochastically and independently determined in both countries in every period. If and were stochastically determined, but perfectly observable by both governments, then countries could agree to adjust the degree of trade liberalization in every period such that no country would have an incentive to deviate.
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Here, it will, however, be assumed that the realizations of and are only privately observable.
The obtained equilibrium outcomes will crucially depend on this informational asymmetry.
Introducing uncertainty about the weight the trading partner attributes to current vis-à-1 0 This is similar to the case of managed trade, explored by Bagwell and Staiger (1990) .
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vis future payo¤s signi…cantly complicates the analysis. The incentive to deviate will not only depend on the ex ante unknown realization of and the degree of liberalization, but also on the likelihood p of the trading partner choosing cooperation. In equilibrium, a government's ex ante probability of opting for cooperation must equal its belief regarding the other government's likelihood of choosing cooperation. Hence, beliefs must be consistent such that Baysean Nash equilibria can be attained.
This also applies in the absence of uncertainty. However, consistent solutions are much easier to derive under certainty. Any prior regarding the likelihood of cooperative behavior of the trading partner either results in deviation or, possibly (i.e. for su¢ ciently low degrees of liberalization), cooperation being a consistent solution. 11 Hence, cooperation over the in…nite horizon is only a matter of establishing trust, such that both countries coordinate on the cooperative solution.
In the face of uncertainty, it is also the case that a propensity for maximally cooperative behavior is required for the most cooperative outcome to be attained, but it may not be su¢ cient to sustain cooperation in all contingencies. Knowing that the trading partner may deviate under certain circumstances feeds back into the decision for when opting for cooperation is optimal.
Anticipating that the foreign country's government must similarly infer its optimal strategy from a belief concerning the likelihood of cooperation by the home country's government, a process of updating of initial priors will yield consistent solutions and thus, Baysean Nash equilibria are obtained. The derivation of consistent solutions turns out to be analytically non-trivial.
As above in the case of certainty, it will be assumed that grim-trigger strategies are applied.
Let v C and v D be the continuation values of the game if both countries cooperate and if at least one country deviates, respectively. For any strictly positive degree of liberalization, the gain from deviating, denoted by , is thus given by
Since w is additively separable, the one-period gain of deviating is independent of what action the trading partner takes, and in particular w N w S = w D w C . Therefore, any decision will solely depend on the domestic shock and the likelihood attributed to cooperation being chosen by the trading partner. Hence, the gain from opting for deviation is expressed as follows
The condition for when cooperation is chosen is thus given by
A country will opt for cooperation as long as realizations of are smaller than the threshold value . This threshold value, in turn, implies an ex ante likelihood of this country choosing cooperation of ( ). In fact, can be regarded as a reaction function of p, i.e. the probability attributed to the trading partner choosing cooperation. By introducing the concept of consistency in beliefs regarding the likelihood of cooperation being chosen, solutions for can be derived by treating p as a prior regarding the likelihood of the trading partner opting for cooperation and updating it.
Symmetry across countries and consistency require that the probability of the trading partner choosing cooperation must equal the implied likelihood of the own country opting for cooperation, 13
i.e. p = prob( ) = ( ). Consistent solutions are thus given by solutions to the following equation
The continuation values v C and v D are given by (see the Appendix for derivation)
Hence, v C is a¤ected by both the degree of liberalization and the associated threshold value, above which deviation will be chosen. Plugging the expressions for v C and v D into equation
(2) and rearrangement of terms then yield the following equation, henceforth referred to as the
The right-hand side of the CSE is given by
Naturally the properties of f ( ; ) depend on the underlying distribution function and it is therefore di¢ cult to make general statements regarding its shape. However, it is easy to see that f ( ; ) decreases monotonously in at a decreasing rate, i.e. @f ( ; ) @ < 0 and
. The partial derivatives with respect to yield no clear results. Depending on the distribution of , f ( ; ) can both increase and decrease in segments of the interval ( min ; max ). As increases, the slope of f ( ; ) decreases for su¢ ciently low (
De…ne ( ) f j = f ( ; )g as the set of consistent solutions. It is easy to see that ( ) 6 = for any degree of cooperation. Since f ( ; 0) = 0, 0 0, implying that cooperation is never chosen, is a consistent solution for any degree of liberalization irrespective of the realization of . Naturally, this is also true in the case of no uncertainty. As mentioned above, the degree of trust in the opponent is of crucial importance for sustaining a cooperative regime. Having low faith in the opponent results in deviation being the best response, under certainty as well as under uncertainty. 13 The following lemma follows by introspection of the CSE.
Lemma 1 For su¢ ciently low degrees of liberalization ( 1 max e max ), there exists a consistent solution ( = 1 max ) associated with a likelihood of cooperation equal to unity. The range of degrees of liberalization, for which cooperation is always chosen, is, however, unambiguously smaller under uncertainty than under certainty (e max < max ).
Hence, it is also possible to sustain cooperation over the in…nte horizon for su¢ ciently low degrees of liberalization, just as in the case of uncertainty, if max < 1. However, the range of degrees of liberalization, for which this is true, is smaller in the case of uncertainty, because
If the degree of liberalization is pushed further than e max , always opting for cooperation can no longer be a consistent solution, because the incentive to deviate will be too strong for large realizations of . There are two possibilities. Either cooperation completely breaks down, i.e. deviation is the preferred option for any , as in the case of certainty for > max ; or it will be the case that cooperation is only chosen for su¢ ciently low realizations of , i.e. the threshold value will lie in the interval ( min ; max ), implying a probability of cooperation being chosen strictly smaller than one, but also strictly larger than zero. In the latter case, deviation will thus occur in …nite time. Let e 0 max be the highest degree of liberalization for which the ex ante probability of choosing cooperation is strictly positive.
In what follows, agreements under which cooperation can be sustained forever will be referred to as safe, while agreements under which the ex ante likelihood of cooperation being chosen is strictly positive, but also strictly smaller than one, will be referred to as self-destructive. Whether there exist self-destructive agreements crucially depends on how the CSE is a¤ected by pushing above e max . Continuity of the density function implies that f ( ; ) is continuous in for > 0.
The …gure below demonstrates the impact of on the solution(s) of the CSE. Using a triangular density function and setting = 0:5, min = 0:1 and max = 0:9, f ( ; ) is plotted for di¤erent values of (thick lines). Consistent solutions, i.e. solutions to the CSE, are given by intersections with the upward-sloping thin line, which represents the left-hand side of the CSE. The dashed vertical line denotes max ; any intersections to its right thus imply a solution with an associated probability of cooperation being chosen equal to one.
When the degree of liberalization is zero 14 , f ( ; ) = 0 for 2 [0; min ] and f ( ; ) = 1 for all 2 ( min ; 1]. Hence, 0 = 0 and = 1 are consistent solutions. As can be easily inferred from the CSE, letting increase above zero will lead to a decrease in f ( ; ) for all 2 ( min ; 1].
Hence, f ( ; ) < 1, but there exist 2 (0; 1), for which f ( ; ) > . Thus, there will be at least two intersections between and f ( ; ) in this interval. Let 1 maxf 2 [0; 1]j = f ( ; )g be 1 4 Note that the plot for = 0 is actually the one obtained for lim !0 f ( ; ).
16 the largest and 2 minf 2 (0; 1]j = f ( ; )g the smallest strictly positive solutions to the CSE, respectively. An increase in will reduce f ( ; ) for all 2 ( min ; 1] and thus, lead to a decrease in 1 and an increase in 2 . As long as e max , 1 max and always cooperating is a consistent solution (as previously stated in Lemma 1). As is increased beyond e max , 1 falls below max , while 2 continues to increase. 15 Eventually, 1 and 2 will coincide, i.e. f ( ; ) < for all > 0 except = 1 = 2 and f ( ; ) will be tangent to for = 1 . Naturally the degree of liberalization at which 1 and 2 coincide is e 0 max , the highest degree of liberalization, for which the ex ante probability of choosing cooperation is strictly positive. Pushing the degree of liberalization beyond e 0 max will lead to f ( ; ) < for all > 0, i.e. 0 = 0 will be the only consistent solution. Hence, 2 no longer exists and 1 coincides with 0 for > e 0 max .
Generally, it will thus be the case that for su¢ ciently low degrees of liberalization, there exist (at least) three di¤erent solutions, 0 , 1 and 2 . Henceforth, it will be assumed that governments wish to behave as cooperatively as possible and thus apply 1 for any given degree of liberalization. Thus, each government has an interest in fostering a belief about itself acting as cooperatively as possible, such that 1 can be derived.
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Naturally, there are many possibilities for the shape of the f -function. But to derive a su¢ cient condition for when self-destructive agreements are feasible, it su¢ ces to examine the case when there exist at most three solutions to the CSE, as in the …gure above. Whether it is possible to increase liberalization beyond e max without cooperation breaking down, will in this case depend on the marginal likelihood of the most myopic realization of occurring, as demonstrated by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Self-destructive agreements exist (i.e. e 0 max > e max ), if
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is the following. A low density for = max implies that a threshold value slightly smaller than max will be associated with a probability of cooperation being chosen negligibly smaller than unity. Hence, the e¤ect on the likelihood of cooperation is only negligibly di¤erent from when there is no uncertainty, in which case cooperation can be sustained when is marginally increased beyond e max , because max > e max . However, if '( max )
is too large, this will no longer be the case. The probability of cooperation being chosen will fall by su¢ ciently much to make opting for deviation the only consistent solution. It is straightforward that a similar condition as stated in the previous proposition, can easily be derived for the case when there exist more than three solutions to the CSE when = e max .
For self-destructive agreements to be feasible as is increased beyond e max , it is necessary that there exists at least one consistent solution > min , for which the density is su¢ ciently low.
From condition (6) we can infer that '( max ) increases unambiguously in and increases in max for max 1 2 . Thus, the scope for self-destructive agreements increases as and/or max attain large values. Letting max go to one, '( max ) becomes in…nitely large, which implies that self-destructive agreements will always exist. Hence, when there is a positive marginal probability that governments can become entirely short-sighted, self-destructive agreements are always feasible. In fact, in this case all agreements are self-destructive for any strictly positive degree of liberalization.
Qualitatively, the results above can also be obtained when …nite Nash reversionary punishment phases are applied. Compared to the case when the grim-trigger strategy is applied, v C v D is smaller for > 0 and > min under a …nite punishment phase. From (2) it then immediately follows that f ( ; ) decreases for > 0 and > min . Thus, a …nite punishment phase will decrease the range of safe agreements, under which breaches against liberalization commitments never occur (unless in the case of max = 1, when safe agreements are not feasible for any > 0), i.e. e max will be smaller. Moreover, the range of agreements with a strictly positive ex ante probability of cooperation being chosen will also diminish, i.e. e 0 max will be smaller. However, just as in the case when the grim-trigger strategy is applied, a tradeo¤ between liberalization and its sustainability may emerge when liberalization is pushed beyond a certain threshold value.
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In the previous section, a su¢ cient condition for when liberalization can be pushed beyond e max without cooperation instantly breaking down was derived This section explores what degree of liberalization is optimal whenever this condition is satis…ed and hence, self-destructive agreements are feasible.
First, consider the case when max 1 opt . Then e max opt , and the optimal degree of liberalization under certainty can be attained with an associated likelihood of cooperation being chosen equal to unity. In this case it is obviously optimal to apply opt , because v C = w C for e max and hence, an increase in beyond opt will lead to a fall in v C . Thus, the optimal agreement under certainty can be replicated for su¢ ciently small values of max , i.e. when governments always attribute su¢ cient weight to the future.
If, however, max > 1 opt , then e max < opt , and the optimal degree of liberalization under certainty cannot be attained with an associated likelihood of cooperation being chosen equal to unity. In this case, the continuation value increases unambiguously in the degree of liberalization for e max , because no deviations will ever occur and hence, there is no tradeo¤ between liberalization and sustainability of cooperation within this range of degrees of liberalization. But will the continuation value increase when the degree of liberalization is pushed beyond e max and the probability for breaching the agreement becomes strictly positive? To assess the impact of an increase of the degree of liberalization beyond e max , consider the derivative of v C with respect to , which is given by
An increase in the degree of liberalization has two e¤ects. First, there is the direct e¤ect on the outcome under mutual cooperation and thus, on the continuation value, measured by the 20 …rst term. Second, there is the indirect impact, stemming from the decrease in due to the increase in the degree of liberalization, discussed in the previous section. This e¤ect depends on d d , which is determined by the CSE.
It is easily established that (see the Appendix)
Since e max < opt , the direct e¤ect of increasing beyond e max is unambiguously positive.
To assess the second e¤ect, it is necessary to calculate the partial derivative of v C with respect to and to set = e max = 1 max (see the Appendix)
This expression is positive for any max . From the previous section, we know that an increase in leads to a decrease in the largest solution of the CSE. The formal expression for
= e max is obtained by calculating the derivative of the CSE with respect to and setting = e max and = max (see the Appendix)
Since it is assumed that '( max ) < '( max ), such that self-destructive agreements exist, this term is negative. Thus, the second e¤ect of increasing beyond e max is unambiguously negative, as expected.
It is easy to see that an increase in '( max ) makes (9) larger and (10) more negative and hence, the combined e¤ect is unambiguously negative. Thus, the larger is '( max ) and hence,the marginal likelihood of breaching the agreement, the stronger is the negative impact of an increase in beyond e max . The marginal likelihood of max occurring therefore determines whether the negative, indirect e¤ect dominates the positive, direct e¤ect of pushing beyond e max . The following proposition provides a su¢ cient condition for when increasing beyond e max is optimal.
Proposition 2 When max > 1 opt , in which case e max < opt , there exists a threshold value '( max ) 0 2 (0; '( max )) such that a self-destructive agreement is preferred to a safe agreement (e opt > e max ) if
Proof. For a self-destructive agreement to be preferred to the most far-reaching safe agreement, a su¢ cient condition is that (8), (9) and (10) in (7) and rearrranging terms, condition (11) follows immediately (see the Appendix).
Hence, given that max > 1 opt , pushing liberalization beyond e max will be worthwhile, if the marginal likelihood of max occurring is su¢ ciently small. In this case the unambiguosly positive e¤ect on the outcome under mutual cooperation outweighs the negative impact, stemming from the decrease in below max such that the probability of a breakdown of the agreement becomes strictly positive.
The threshold value '( max ) 0 solely depends on and max ; the term
fact, a function of max . By plugging expression (6) into (11), an expression for '( max ) 0 can be 22 obtained such that the impact of changes in and max can be more easily assessed
Since e max < opt , it is the case that
0. An increase in max implies a lower e max and thus a lower value for
, because w C is concave in . Therefore, the …rst term of the denominator will unambiguously decrease when max is increased. 
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A high value of max implies a high '( max ) 0 and hence, increasing beyond e max will be optimal except when the marginal likelihood of max occurring is very high; in fact it will always be bene…cial to increase beyond e max if max = 1, in which case e max = 0 and no safe agreement with a strictly positive degree of liberalization is feasible. The intuition is as follows. A higher max implies a lower e max , i.e. the scope for safe agreements is smaller. The positive e¤ect of increasing beyond e max thus increases in max . The negative e¤ect of an increase in beyond e max on the likelihood of cooperation, which depends on '( max ), can thus be larger the larger is max , without the overall impact of an increase in beyond e max becoming negative.
The e¤ect of an increase in on '( max ) 0 is unambiguously positive. The underlying reason is that a larger implies a lower expected weight attributed to the future. Since the risk of breakdown occurring increases in the number of future periods, a lower expected weighting of the future implies a lower weighting of the negative impact of increasing beyond e max . The following lemma summarizes the above …ndings. . However, even if max < 1 2
, the e¤ect of an increase in max on '( max) 0 may be unambiguously positive (it will depend on the speci…cation of w C , however).
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Lemma 2 The scope for self-destructive agreements being preferred to safe agreements, increases (i) if is su¢ ciently large; (ii) if max is su¢ ciently large; and (iii) if '( max ) is su¢ ciently small.
Conclusion
The answer to the question posed in the title is a¢ rmative: it may be optimal to agree on a degree of liberalization such that cooperation will eventually break down. A preference for self-destructive rather than safe agreements may arise in the present context of an in…nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma tari¤ setting game between two symmetric countries, where the stochastically determined weight each government attributes to current vis-à-vis future payo¤s is only privately observable. The model demonstrates how trade liberalization can suddenly break down and is thus consistent with the occurrence of trade wars.
The optimal agreement under certainty can be replicated under uncertainty if governments will always attribute su¢ cient weight to the future. Hence, applying the degree of liberalization that is optimal under certainty, while maintaining certainty of cooperation, will only be possible when the weight given to current payo¤s is su¢ ciently low even under the most myopic realization of the random variable. If the latter is not the case, the degree of liberalization should at least be set at the level where the probability of deviation occurring just becomes strictly positive.
Pushing the degree of liberalization further, the positive e¤ect of more liberalization will have to be weighed against the negative impact of the ex ante likelihood of cooperation breaking down becoming strictly positive. If the latter outweighs the former, implementing the most farreaching safe agreement is optimal. Else, it is optimal to implement a self-destructive agreement with a higher degree of liberalization than under the most far-reaching safe agreement. The latter outcome is more likely for a large ex ante expected weight given to current payo¤s, for a large maximum possible weight attributed to current payo¤s, and a small marginal likelihood of the maximum possible weight given to current payo¤s.
The results obtained in this paper apply to the case of in…nite Nash reversion following breaches against liberalization commitments, but can easily be generalized to a situation where punishments for deviations from liberalization are …nite. In this case the same tradeo¤ between more liberalization and a higher risk for deviations from liberalization occurring may emerge, and it may be optimal to implement an agreement, under which there is a strictly positive likelihood for protectionism occurring along the equilibrium path. Hence deviations from the cooperative degree of liberalization followed by retaliatory phases will occur in this framework of hidden information, just as in the presence of hidden-action-type of uncertainty, but, contrary to the case of hidden action, Nash reversions will be the consequences of such deviations having actually The …ndings generated by the trade-policy framework presented here can easily be generalized to any type of repeated Prisoner's-Dilemma-type of strategic interaction taking place under hidden information. For example, in a Cournot duopoly …rms may …nd it optimal to apply a degree of cooperation that cannot be upheld inde…nitely in the presence of asymmetric information concerning the incentives to deviate from the agreed-upon degree of cooperation. Just as in the case of hidden-action-type of uncertainty, the optimal degree of cooperation may be associated with deviations from the cooperative regime along the equilibrium path. 
Hence,
Proof of Proposition 1
Given that there exist no more than three solutions to the CSE, and since f ( max ) = max for = e max , it must be that lim ! max f 0 ( ) < 1 (note that f 0 ( ) = 0 for > max ) for = e max for there to exist strictly positive solutions to the CSE when is increased beyond e max . For > e max , the continuation value v C is given by (4), and hence,
Since = max for = e max , we get
and hence, Equation (9) Deriving the expression for v C with respect to and setting = e max = 1 max (implying = max ) yields The CSE (5) can be rewritten as follows: 
